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The United States Army is transforming and at war.  This transformation is 
enabled by the 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).  If approved, this 
BRAC round will require the Army to spend about $13 billion over six years, moving 
over 2,500 distinct units and undertaking military construction projects at about 180 
locations. An anticipated savings of $24 billion over 20 years motivates this expense.  
During implementation of the last BRAC round in 1995, the Army used an integer linear 
program, the BRAC Action Scheduler (BRACAS), to prescribe BRAC implementation 
schedules. We modify BRACAS by adding unit-level resolution, including schedules and 
personnel strength to account for wartime deployments and transformation initiatives.  
The improved BRACAS produces realistic execution plans, and generates a schedule of 
feasibly timed unit moves.  We conduct an extensive analysis using data provided by the 
Army.  Our analysis shows the Army can synchronize BRAC implementation, 
transformation initiatives and wartime requirements.  We find that including the 
deployment and transformation schedule limitations of major units does not significantly 
impact BRAC savings.  We also find unlimited annual implementation budgets make 
additional savings approaching $900 million possible.  Returning forces from Germany 
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The United States Army is transforming and at war.  This transformation is 
enabled by the 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).  If approved, this 
BRAC round will require the Army to spend about $13 billion over six years, moving 
over 2,500 distinct units and undertaking military construction projects at about 180 
locations. An anticipated savings of $24 billion over 20 years motivates this expense.  
During implementation of the last BRAC round in 1995, the Army used an integer linear 
program, the BRAC Action Scheduler (BRACAS), to prescribe BRAC implementation 
schedules. We modify BRACAS by adding unit-level resolution, including schedules and 
personnel strength to account for wartime deployments and transformation initiatives.   
We conduct an analysis using data from a candidate set of recommendations that 
is very similar to the Army’s final BRAC 2005 recommendations.  We use this data to 
explore several scenarios.  We manipulate both the input data and BRACAS constraints 
to consider anticipated BRAC implementation issues.  These include the feasibility of 
BRAC implementation subject to unit availability, impact of implementation budgets on 
savings, budget requirements for accelerated or delayed implementation, regional 
Military Construction (MILCON) budget limits, and the impact of moving units on 
specified schedules before MILCON is complete.  
We conclude the Army can execute BRAC with little disruption to transformation 
and deployment plans while still achieving projected savings.  Our results indicate that 
total BRAC savings are not impacted by including the deployment and transformation 
schedule limitations of major units that will move during the implementation period.  We 
find a need for at least a $500 million MILCON limit per region per year.  Our results 
suggest unrestricted annual budgets would allow additional savings approaching $900 
million.  This invites a more detailed budget analysis to seek greater savings by making 
acceptable changes to planned annual BRAC budgets.  Returning forces from Germany 
early can save additional money - up to $4 billion minus the additional facilities costs. 
 xviii
The improved BRACAS produces realistic execution plans, and generates a 
schedule of feasibly timed unit moves.  The Army and the other services can use 
BRACAS to develop implementation plans and budgets that maximize savings while 
explicitly considering unit availability, the Integrated Global Presence and Basing 
Strategy, modularity requirements, and transformation.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
We address the immediate need of the U. S. Army to plan to implement the 2005 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations.  We seek a six-year 
implementation schedule that minimizes disruption to other transformation initiatives, 
supports wartime requirements for unit operational availability, and makes the best use of 
resources by generating the greatest savings within budget limits. 
B. APPROACH 
We use the Base Realignment and Closure Action Scheduler (BRACAS), a 
proven capital budgeting model used by the Army in past rounds of base closures [Dell, 
1998].  We improve the model by incorporating unit-level fidelity.  We introduce 
additional data regarding a unit’s strength, and availability to move.  These 
considerations allow some costs to be linked directly to feasible unit moves.  We allocate 
costs according to unit strength, resulting in a more realistic budget proposal.  We use the 
modified model to explore anticipated questions from senior decision makers and BRAC 
implementation planners. 
C. OVERVIEW 
We first present some BRAC background information.  We highlight significant 
changes in the implementation environment since the previous BRAC round in 1995.  We 
then present the modified BRACAS model.  We use the model to explore questions we 
anticipate may arise in planning for BRAC implementation.  We present results based on 
data that closely resemble the Army’s list of recommended closures and realignments.  
We offer a few insights regarding scheduling of unit moves, budgeting, and management 



























A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURES 
1. Base Realignment and Closure  
a. Why We Close Bases 
Base realignments and closures are necessary to help the Department of 
Defense (DoD) adapt to changes in the world.  As technology, strategy, and even 
demographics evolve, new missions are created, and old missions become obsolete.  
Organizations must occasionally rearrange their internal structure, reassign 
responsibilities and functions to different divisions, acquire new capabilities, and divest 
themselves of unneeded or unwanted capabilities [Garamone, 2005].  In this sense, DoD 
is no different than any large, diverse organization: it must continuously reassess its 
capabilities and adapt to remain relevant, efficient and ready. 
b. Why We Legislate Base Closures 
Unlike a normal business, Congress funds DoD.  Two senators and one 
member of the House of Representatives can claim each installation in the United States.  
These installations provide jobs, and are important to the local economy.  When a 
government proposal threatens the local economy in an elected official’s district, he or 
she naturally is inclined to oppose it.  This makes it difficult for DoD to close a facility, 
or even reorganize operations on a large scale without Congressional resistance. 
Congress recognizes the legitimate need of DoD to close bases and realign 
missions in order to reduce the size of the defense budget and remain efficient.  Past 
experiences have helped Congress develop and improve a process that insulates base 
closure decisions from political influence, and protects implementation actions from 
political derailment [Government Accountability Office (GAO), 1997]. 
Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended, dictates the process for 
BRAC [GAO, 2002].  In brief, the process begins with Congress authorizing a new round 
of base closures.  The Defense Department conducts a study to determine which facilities 
are to be closed, based on specific criteria [DoD, 2005a].  The President appoints the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to perform the oversight role 
normally provided by Congress.  DoD submits its recommendations.  The commission 
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reviews and studies the recommendations, and has the ability to add and remove 
recommendations.  The commission’s recommendations (not DoD’s) are forwarded to 
the President, who must accept or reject the list as a whole.  If he accepts the 
recommendations, Congress has a specified time frame to take positive action to end the 
process.  If Congress does not act, the committee’s recommendations become law.  DoD 
must complete all closure and realignment actions within six years [DoD, 2005b].   Table 
1 summarizes the timeline of key events. 
Time Frame Key BRAC Action 
December 2001 Congress authorizes BRAC 2005 
2003 through 2005 DoD conducts internal analyses 
March 15, 2005 President appoints Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
May 13, 2005 DoD announces recommendations 
September 8, 2005 Commission recommendations due to President 
September 23, 2005 President accepts or rejects Commission's list 
October 20, 2005 Commission's revised list due to President if applicable 
   
Congress has 45 legislative days from presidential approval to halt BRAC 2005 
DoD has six years from presidential approval to implement recommendations 
Table 1. BRAC 2005 Timeline (after DoD, 2005b). 
 
2. The Role of BRACAS 
BRACAS has been used during the development of the Army’s 2005 BRAC 
recommendations to consider the total savings possible for proposed base closure 
scenarios given various budget options.  In this role, BRACAS has served as a tool for 
senior decision makers to understand the fiscal implications of different options under 
consideration. 
DoD released its recommendations on May 13, 2005 [DoD, 2005c].  As the 
review of the list progresses, the Army must develop a specific plan to implement the 
proposed recommendations.  It must be prepared to adjust rapidly if recommendations are 
changed.  There are many factors – some of them new – that must be incorporated into 
this planning effort.  Several are described below.  BRACAS accounts for these factors to 
help the Army develop an implementation plan now that will be ready to execute when 
BRAC recommendations become law. 
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B. THE CHANGED IMPLEMENTATION ENVIRONMENT 
Four previous rounds of base closures took place in 1988, 1991, 1993 and 1995 
[GAO, 2002].  During this period, DoD conducted a major reduction in the number of 
people on active duty, while the Army also reduced its structure from 18 to 10 active duty 
divisions.  U.S. military forces were not heavily engaged in operations around the globe.  
The strategic situation changed radically in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
In previous rounds, BRAC seemed like a natural part of the main focus of DoD – 
downsizing the force.  Today the environment for implementing BRAC has changed 
dramatically. 
1. The Operational Environment 
Unlike past BRAC rounds, the present round finds the Army at war.  Over 
150,000 Soldiers are currently conducting combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
[Dickson, 2005].  While we cannot know what the required force level will be over the 
six-year implementation period, it is prudent to assume that the current level of 
commitment will continue.  Units are deployed for one-year tours, and some units have 
their deployments extended.  All units require time to train before and recover after a 
deployment.  This wartime reality restricts unit availability to move and is a critical factor 
in developing any BRAC implementation plan. 
2. Transformation 
The Army is undergoing a major restructuring of its operational forces.  The 
Army Campaign Plan (ACP) is the roadmap for this transformation, and designates a 
time for each unit to adopt the new modular force structure.  This modularity conversion 
takes a unit’s full attention, and renders the unit unavailable for both deployment and 
relocation.  Any acceptable implementation plan must support the ACP unit 
transformation timeline. [Department of the Army (DA), 2004a] 
3. Life Cycle Manning 
The Army has also scheduled units for implementing Life Cycle Manning (LCM) 
[DA, 2005].  Under LCM, most soldiers will arrive nearly simultaneously at a unit and 
will remain with the unit throughout its life cycle, typically three years.  At the end of the 
life cycle, some soldiers may remain with the unit for the next life cycle, while others 
depart for different assignments and a fresh group of Soldiers replaces them.  At the 
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beginning of a cycle, the unit is fully engaged in receiving new personnel and getting 
organized, and is unavailable for operational deployments [DA 2004b, 2005].  Shortly 
after the beginning of a unit’s life cycle – when the majority of the personnel and their 
families have just arrived at the installation – seems the least appropriate time to move 
the unit.  The rhythm of LCM must be considered in planning unit moves. 
4. Reserve Component (RC) Forces 
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), RC forces have 
experienced a dramatic increase in activations and deployments, including extensive 
deployments to conduct combat operations.  In this environment of increased operational 
demands on the RC, we are for the first time making considerable changes in RC 
installations as part of BRAC.  The majority of the Army 2005 closure recommendations 
involve consolidation of multiple RC facilities into one nearby Armed Forces Reserve 
Center. 
5. Return of Forces from Overseas 
The IGPBS is under review and decisions are pending, but the intent to return 
large numbers of forces from Germany and South Korea to the United States has already 
been announced [Naylor, 2005].  These basing decisions are technically separate from 
BRAC, which only addresses closure or realignment of installations within the United 
States.  Nevertheless, the Army recognizes the need to synchronize these two programs to 
close bases and move units.  BRAC considers only the infrastructure needed to host 
forces returning from overseas, and does not consider the decision to move those forces.  
The Army will address both considerations with a viable plan for BRAC implementation 
that synchronizes all moves, regardless of where units are stationed. 
6. Recruiting, Retention, and Stability 
The Army is currently experiencing increased difficulty in recruiting [Hess, 
2005].  Many factors may be contributing to the Army’s difficulty in recruiting the 
desired number of soldiers.  The GWOT may be deterring some recruits, and a positive 
economic picture may be contributing as well.  Soldiers currently serving are staying in 
the Army at high rates, but the increased frequency, length, and danger of deployments 
have senior leaders very concerned about the long-term ability of the Army to retain 
experienced soldiers. 
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LCM and the transformation outlined in the ACP (including the creation of 
additional units to share in the deployment rotation) are key elements in retention.  These 
initiatives aim to relieve some of the pressure on deployment frequency and length as 
well as provide families with a more stable home life while soldiers are deployed.  Other 
personnel initiatives, such as allowing repetitive tours at the same installation, are 
designed to provide additional stability. 
The key component in stability is predictability.  The Army Force Generation 
Model, along with LCM, is designed to let both units and Army leaders know when a unit 
is available for operation [DA, 2004b].  It also affords Soldiers and their families some 
measure of predictability.  It is important that BRAC implementation, to the extent 
possible, does not disrupt these initiatives.  Disruption delays achievement of important 
Army goals and impacts the stability and predictability for Army families.  One ACP 
objective is improving stability for soldiers and families, which emphasizes the need for 
planning BRAC implementation to “run in the background” as other initiatives move 


























III. OPTIMIZING BRAC IMPLEMENTATION 
A. HISTORY OF THE BRAC ACTION SCHEDULER (BRACAS) MODEL 
1. The Purpose of BRACAS  
BRACAS is a capital planning model.  It was first developed after BRAC 1993 as 
an improved method of analyzing the trade-off between capital investment and future 
savings as the Army prepared for BRAC 1995.  BRACAS can explore a variety of 
factors, including annual categorical expenditures, budget plan feasibility, optimal 
budgets for maximum savings, the timeline for completed actions, and a cost-benefit for 
accelerating military construction (MILCON).  Policies under consideration can be 
modeled as additional restrictions, allowing a comparative quantitative analysis that 
supports decision makers. 
2. History of BRACAS  
Original versions of BRACAS were reported by Free [1994] and Wong [1995].  
After some improvements and modifications, it was used by the Army in 1995 [Dell 
1998].  AlRomaihi [2004] added environmental costs and considered their impact on 
implementation budgets. Subsequently, Dell and Royset implemented unpublished 
modifications in 2004 and 2005, including a stochastic version to model variability in 
environmental cleanup costs. 
During BRAC 1995, the Army had already submitted its budget program before 
BRAC decisions were final.  Afterwards, an analysis of potential savings was completed 
using BRACAS.  The study showed the Army could realize an additional $233 million in 
net savings by spending $100 million earlier than originally projected.  Army leaders 
reprogrammed funds within the budget to achieve this savings.  We note here that the 
GAO [2005] has recently published their findings that cost and savings projections from 
prior BRAC rounds have been surprisingly accurate, and savings may be ahead of 





3. Strengths and Shortcomings 
BRACAS has several strengths:  It has a proven track record.  It is known by the 
decision makers who set policies regarding BRAC implementation.  It models all 
categories of costs that are calculated by the Cost Of Base Realignment Actions 
(COBRA) model, the approved tool for BRAC cost estimation [DoD, 2005d].  It may 
have helped the Army save several hundred million dollars already. 
There are areas that need improvement.  The Army must carry out the 2005 
BRAC decisions in a far more complicated and constrained environment.  BRAC 
implementation must be carefully planned and executed to prevent any disruption in 
combat operations.  Prior versions of BRACAS did not model wartime considerations.  
Explicitly modeling these considerations at the beginning of the planning cycle ensures 
the Army begins with reasonable budget expectations and a feasible unit movement 
schedule. 
The concerns above may seem exaggerated, but they must be considered.  There 
is a theorem in optimization that guarantees one can never find a better solution to an 
optimization problem by adding a new constraint or restriction.  Either the restriction will 
not have any effect, or it will make the situation worse by making a previous solution 
unattainable.  The restriction of allowing units to move only during certain narrow 
windows of opportunity rather than at any time could, theoretically, be so limiting that no 
solution can be found at any cost.  We do not anticipate anything so dire.  However, if 
this arises, the only way to find a solution is to eliminate some other restriction – e.g., 
change the budget, the deployment schedules, and so on.   
If the budget plans for BRAC produced by the current version of BRACAS do not 
allow a feasible solution while leaving other initiatives unchanged, the Army must either 
increase the required budget, reduce anticipated savings, or both.  The savings in the 
early years of implementation help fund future years, so unrealized savings are a concern.   
A more fundamental concern is the impact of unit moves on the Army’s ability to 
execute contingency plans.  It is essential that operational planners know when forces are 
available, arguably much more essential than predicting budget requirements within tight 
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tolerances.  Regardless of whether a unit is committed due to transformation, combat, or 
a BRAC-induced move, the unit is not available for other tasks.    
Ensuring that the proposed implementation budget is created along with a feasible 
implementation schedule can help avoid potentially serious pitfalls.  By exploring these 
issues simultaneously, we can be confident that we have found at least one way to 
successfully navigate the road ahead.      
B. BRACAS FORMULATION 
1. Indices 
, '      years of the closure process ( = 1, 2, ... , 20). 
, '     first/second half of the year ( = 1, 2).
installation losing activity.
installation gaining activity.







 'accelerated', 'slow'  ).
units (or activities) moving from one installation to another.




2. Indexed Sets 
       installations gaining unit from losing installation . 
       installations gaining unit located in region . 
       installations losing unit to gaining installation .








U ing from losing installation .
      units moving to gaining installation .








a. Losing Installation Cost and Savings Data  
lCONSAV  is all procurement and construction costs avoided as a direct 
result of realignment of the losing installation l. 
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lENVCOST  is the total environment cleanup cost for the losing 
installation l. 
lRECSAV  is the recurring savings after completing actions at the losing 
installation l. 
lRETIR  is the yearly civilian early retirement cost at the losing installation 
l attributable to its realignment. 
lSEVPAY  is the cost for civilian reduction-in-force (RIF) attributable to 
the realignment at losing installation l. 
lUNIQLCOST  is the unique (non-standard) cost of actions required to 
realign losing installation l. 
b. Gaining Installation Cost Data  
' '   is the cost of type  construction at the gaining installation 
in the -th half of year (year  dollars) when type  construction started in the
-th half of year .
ct q tqgMILCON c g
q t c
q t′ ′
gTOTALMILCON  is the total cost of construction at the gaining 
installation g. 
gNEWHIRE  is the cost of all new hires at the gaining installation g. 
gUNIQGCOST  is the unique (non-standard) cost of actions required to 
realign gaining installation g. 
c. Transfer Cost Data from Losing to Gaining Installations 
glPCS  is the cost to move all civilians and the additional cost above 
normal rotation rates to move military personnel from the losing 
installation l to the gaining installation g. COBRA uses 100% of civilian 
strength and 54% of military strength to determine the BRAC-induced 
movement costs. 
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glFREIGHT  is the cost to ship all office and special equipment from the 
losing installation l to the gaining installation g. 
d. Unit Data 
,    together specify if unit  can move, cannot move, or must 





uMILSTRENGTH  is the number of military personnel in unit u. 
uCIVSTRENGTH  is the number of civilian personnel in unit u. 
uPERCENT  is the percentage a unit contributes to the total personnel 
strength of units leaving its losing installation. 
e. Additional Data 
,cg cgCY CQ  is the number of years and half years, respectively, required to 
complete type c construction at the gaining installation g. 
ctqgTY  is the year when type c construction starts at the gaining installation 
g, which ends in the q-th half of year t, i.e., 1ctqg cgTY t CY= − + , 
if 0 and 2cgCQ q= = , and ctqg cgTY t CY= − , otherwise.  
ctqgTQ  is the half year when type c construction starts at the gaining 
installation g, which ends the q-th half of year t, i.e., 1ctqgTQ = , 
if 0and 2cgCQ q= = , or 1and 1cgCQ q= = . 2ctqgTQ = , if 0cgCQ =  and 
1q = , or 1and 2.cgCQ q= =   
tDEVPEN  is the penalty for exceeding the budget in year .t  
tDIS  is the discount applied to a dollar in year t  for the Net Present Value 
(NPV). ( tDIS  = 1/
0.5(1 )td −+  where d is the COBRA discount rate.) 
ltOVERHEAD  is the program cost distributed over four years at the losing 
installation in constant dollars. 0 5, .ltOVERHEAD t l= ∀ ≥ ∀  
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ltPERLOW  is the minimum percent of the total environmental cleanup 
cost to allocate at a losing installation l in year .t  
ltPERHIGH  is the maximum percent of the total environmental cleanup 
cost to allocate at a losing installation l in year .t  
gREQ  is the fraction of personnel and freight that can move onto the 
gaining installation without completing construction at the gaining 
installation g. 
lFE  is the fraction of the total environmental cost that counts towards 
NPV calculations. 
lFED  is the fraction of the total environmental cost that needs to be paid 
before installation can be closed. 
tWEDGE  is the total funds available for BRAC actions in year t  (in year 
t  dollars). 
trCEIL  is the upper limit on military construction funds that can be 
managed in year t in Installation Management Agency (IMA) region r. 
EARLYPEN  is the penalty factor incurred if movement to a gaining 
installation occurs before the completion of all construction. 
4. Variables 
a. Binary Decision Variables 
ctqgbuild  is one if type c construction at the gaining installation  g begins 
during the q-th half of year t , and zero otherwise. 
tquunitmove  one if unit u moves during the q-th half of year t, else zero. 
tqgearlymove  is one if a unit moves to gaining installation g in year t and 
half-year q prior to the completion of all military construction at g. 
tqldone  is one if all actions at the losing installation l are complete during 
the q-th half and year t , and zero otherwise. 
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b. Continuous Decision Variables 
tlcivrif  is the spending in year t  (in year t  dollars) for civilian receiving 
RIF notices at the losing installation .l  
tdev  is the excess spending in year t , the amount exceeding tWEDGE . 
tlenvir  is the spending in year t  (in year t  dollars) for environmental 
cleanup costs at the losing installation .l  
tghire  is the spending in year t  (in year t  dollars) for hiring at the gaining 
installation g. 
trimaslack is the amount in year t that MILCON spending in region r 
exceeds the region’s annual limit, trCEIL . 
tqlpper  is the fraction of realignment completed in the q-th half of 
year t for losing installation .l  
tluniql  is the spending in year t  (in year t  dollars) for unique one-time 
costs at the losing installation .l  
tguniqg  is the spending in year t  (in year t  dollars) for unique one-time 
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C. EXPLANATION OF THE MODEL 
The objective function seeks to maximize the NPV of the total BRAC savings 
over a 20 year horizon.  It sums the recurring savings in all years after closure through 
year 20 for all closing or realigning bases, as well as the one-time cost avoidances at each 
base.  It subtracts all costs incurred in order to implement all closures and realignments.  
Finally, it penalizes any deviation above the annual implementation budget and unit 
movement before MILCON is completed. 
Inequalities 1a and 1b limit all expenditures in a year to the annual budget, or 
measure any deviation.  Note that Inequality 1a applies to only years 1 through 6, the  
 
20 
implementation horizon.  The simpler Inequality 1b considers only environmental costs 
in years 7 through twenty, as all actions other than environmental clean up must already 
be complete. 
Inequality 2a limits the percent of the realignment that is complete to the percent 
of personnel movement costs associated with unit moves.  Inequality 2b requires all 
realignment actions to be completed by year six. 
Inequalities 3a through 3d limit the moves of units to a gaining installation by 
ensuring the total fraction of the units moved does not exceed the fraction of the required 
expenditures for different categories of funds at the gaining installation.  Inequality 3a 
links the moves to the hiring of new personnel.  Inequality 3b links moves to the amount 
of equipment that has been shipped to the gaining installation from the losing installation.  
Inequality 3c links the moves to unique costs that must be paid at the gaining installation.  
Lastly, Inequality 3d requires that military construction at the gaining installation be 
complete before the majority of a unit moves, or records an early move (which is 
penalized) otherwise. 
Inequalities 4a through 4e require that certain activities be completed before an 
installation losing activity can be declared finished and can start contributing recurring 
savings.  Inequality 4a requires payment of all the unique costs associated with the 
installation.  Inequality 4b ensures payment of the minimum required percentage of total 
environmental costs.  Inequality 4c demands payment of the total bill to move all 
personnel, while Inequality 4d simply requires that all units moving from an installation 
have moved before the action considered complete.  Inequality 4e ensures military 
construction at an installation gaining activity from a losing installation has been 
completed before the losing action is declared complete. 
Inequality 5 establishes minimum and maximum environmental expenditures for 
every budget year by installation. 
Equation 6 pays the total civilian personnel separation actions cost. 
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Equation 7 closes or realigns all installations losing activity by the end of the six 
year implementation period, while Equation 8 pays the entire environmental cleanup cost 
by the end of the twenty year horizon. 
Equation 9 moves every unit exactly once. 
Inequality 10 ensures the total bill for moving personnel is paid. 
Inequality 11 limits the total military construction in a given year and region. 
Inequality 12 ensures units move only when available.  For a given period, we set 
0tqutquFIX FIX= =  if a unit is unavailable to move, 1tqutquFIX FIX= = to force a move, 
or 0 and 1tqutquFIX FIX= =  otherwise. 
The statements labeled Equation 13 require all decision variables in the model be 





























A. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION  
1. Assumptions 
Units are considered unavailable to move during 18-month periods comprising 
training, deployment, and recovery.  The training and recovery periods, spent primarily at 
the unit’s home installation, are included in the 18-month window from the end of one 
deployment to the beginning of the next.  This leaves a unit available for only 12 months 
in a 30-month period.   
Modularity requirements and implementing LCM each render a unit unavailable 
to move for a six-month period.  
We consider RC units available to move at all times; reserve units would 
primarily relocate to new facilities within the same local area.  BRACAS could easily 
accommodate any specified unavailability.  
COBRA cost estimates are dated but accurate.  COBRA uses a past snapshot of 
installation status for cost estimates.  The BRAC Division of the Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Installation Management is gathering installation data to guide implementation; 
BRACAS can be updated as new data are available.    
2. Data 
COBRA data are the DoD standard for all internal comparative analyses for 
BRAC.  COBRA accepts data from a variety of information sources and produces a 
several reports for every proposed stationing action.  BRACAS requires the COBRA cost 
estimates by categories and the expected duration of all MILCON projects for every 
stationing action.  COBRA reports these figures for every installation, whether gaining or 
losing an activity. 
The Total Army Basing Study (TABS) office provides a list of units or activities 
moving from each losing installation, what installation they are moving to, and the 
assigned military and civilian personnel strength of the unit. 
We construct the data regarding unit availability from several sources.  Army 
publications provide the schedules for modularity and LCM.  We use open sources to 
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estimate when major units deploy.  We assume non-availability windows of 18 months, 
to allow for one-year deployments with preparation and recovery, followed by a 12- 
month availability period.  We base this on a respite of 18 months between deployments; 
units use six months for deployment preparation and recovery.  This accurately reflects 
today’s thirty month cycle, though the Army Force Generation Model aims to ultimately 
achieve a two year time at home station between deployments. 
The data we use come from a candidate set of recommendations TABS 
considered during its BRAC analysis.  The data closely match the final recommendations 
released by DoD.  While we believe this represents the actual BRAC implementation 
challenge well in terms of overall costs, units and activities moving, and so on, we cannot 
guarantee the conclusions and insights below hold for the actual BRAC 2005 data. 
3. Software 
We implement BRACAS using the Generalized Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) Integrated Development Environment.  GAMS [2004] is a tool for encoding 
mathematical programming formulations such as BRACAS, generating an instance of the 
problem, interacting with separate software packages that actually solve the problem, and 
receiving and displaying output reports from the solver software.  BRACAS as described 
above is a mixed integer linear program.  We use the CPLEX 9.0 solver [GAMS-CPLEX, 
2004]. 
4. Computational Results 
Our BRACAS instance represents moving or realigning over 2,500 units or 
activities from over 600 installations (mostly small installations such as reserve centers), 
while initiating MILCON projects at over 170 different locations at a cost of about $11 
billion over six years.  When GAMS generates a model for this data and the formulation 
above, the result is about 130,000 equations and 165,000 variables, of which 40,000 are 
binary.   
Model generation averages about 10 minutes.  This is a significant increase over 
the previous version of BRACAS, where the model generates in about 20 seconds.  
Solution times vary, but are most frequently around 10 minutes, using an optimality gap 
of 0.01%.  This is also a significant increase, as the previous BRACAS solves the same 
instances in about one minute. 
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While slower solve times are not desirable, they are still well within reasonable 
time limits.  The inclusion of additional sets, indices, data tables, and binary decision 
variables accounts for this increased computational cost.  For the reasons explained 
previously, we feel this is a minor inconvenience and a worthwhile trade-off to improve 




Table 2. Model Statistics Comparison For BRACAS Versions 
 
















































Figure 1.   Percent Increase in Model Factors 
 
B. COMPARISON OF SOLUTIONS BETWEEN BRACAS VERSIONS 
The solutions from the most recent version of BRACAS developed prior to this 
thesis and the formulation described above closely coincide: we see only a 1.5% 
difference in the 20 year NPV.  The modified version of BRACAS incorporates unit data 
and shares aggregated costs according to strength.  This explicit handling of fair-share 
costs produces a more accurate calculation, but does not change the scale of the problem 
 PREVIOUS CURRENT 
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS      31 30 
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES      15 14 
SINGLE EQUATIONS     25356 129364 
SINGLE VARIABLES     55393 163377 
DISCRETE VARIABLES    9540 40284 
NON ZERO ELEMENTS     414509 2732486 
GENERATION TIME       19.953 497.25 
EXECUTION TIME        65.531 520.954 
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appreciably.  We hope this encourages those with confidence in the previous version 
results to consider the new version favorably. 
C. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
1. Anticipated Questions in Planning BRAC Implementation 
The list below contains some key questions we anticipate planners and decision 
makers may ask during BRAC implementation: 
Q1. Does BRAC force a change in other plans and schedules – deployments, 
transformation, or life cycle manning? 
Q2. What is the maximum savings with an unlimited implementation budget? 
Q3. What additional costs or savings result from dictating a particular 
movement schedule? 
Q4. What is the effect of moving units before all construction is complete at 
the gaining installation? 
Q5. What is the effect of limiting in-progress MILCON to a specific annual 
limit per year in every region?   
Q6. What budget is required for the fastest possible completion of all BRAC 
actions? 
Q7. How much can we delay implementation and still complete BRAC on 
time? 
2. Modifications for Exploratory Analysis 
We modify aspects of the basic model to address the questions above.  We 
describe the modeling changes here and subsequently present results. 
Q1. Does BRAC force a change in other plans and schedules – deployments, 
transformation, or life cycle manning? 
We represent other plans and schedules by manipulating  and .tqu tquFIX FIX   We 
overlay the schedules for deployments, transformation, and LCM on a single timeline.  
We represent committed time as a 1 on a unit’s timeline.  Our implementation of 
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Equation 12 ensures no unit moves during these unavailable times.  Any feasible solution 
means it is possible to implement BRAC without additional schedule changes.  
Q2. What is the maximum savings with an unlimited implementation budget? 
To determine the maximum possible savings, we remove all budget limits.  This 
relaxation determines the theoretical maximum savings. 
Q3. What additional costs or savings result from dictating a particular 
movement schedule? 
We measure the impact of a specified unit movement schedule by adjusting the 
 and tqu tquFIX FIX bounds to the appropriate values.  
Q4. What is the effect of moving units before all construction is complete at 
the gaining installation? 
There must be facilities available at the gaining installation to receive a unit.  
However, this requirement does not mean that all BRAC-related MILCON must be 
complete prior to a unit move.  The Army has the option of using existing facilities if 
available or temporary facilities otherwise.  We introduce an additional binary variable 
into Equation 3d.  This allows the unit to move either before or after MILCON is 
complete.  To deter early moves we include a penalty in the objective function.  This 
penalty represents the additional costs of an early move.   We can adjust this penalty to 
reflect the costs of a particular scenario.   
We consider this early move option for several reasons.  First, the Army is using 
temporary facilities for newly created units as transformation proceeds while awaiting 
final BRAC decisions.  This means there is a precedent and it is worth considering 
[Loring, 2004].  Second, it provides additional flexibility while planning implementation.  
Other requirements like the deployment rotation may make it advantageous to move a 
unit before all MILCON is complete.  This modification makes exploration of these 
options readily available, even though such options and costs were not part of the original 
BRAC analysis.  Finally, we need this modification to answer questions regarding 
specified unit movement timelines that would otherwise violate the requirement to wait 
for MILCON.  
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Q5. What is the effect of limiting in-progress MILCON to a specific annual 
limit per year in every region?   
Planners seek to minimize the difficulty in managing implementation for all Army 
agencies.  IMA has four regions within CONUS, each responsible for overseeing 
MILCON projects on its installations.  We place annual limits by region on MILCON 
expenditures.  This entails the addition of several features to the model.  First, we add the 
set of affected IMA regions, and we index all gaining installations by region.  We then 
implement Equation 11.  We introduce an elastic variable to allow for a feasible solution 
if the desired limits prove too restrictive.  Finally, we modify the objective function to 
penalize exceeding the limits. 
Q6 and Q7.  What budget is required for the fastest possible completion of all 
BRAC actions?  How much can we delay implementation and still complete BRAC on 
time? 
In order to determine the fastest and slowest possible implementation timelines 
and their associated budgets, we manipulate the cost of money.  By manipulating the 
discount rate, we make it extremely advantageous to spend money sooner.  This 
generates the fastest feasible movement schedule.  We then record this schedule, restore 
the discount rate to the proper level, and resolve.  This solves for the other variables, and 
produces the accompanying budget that enables the fastest possible schedule.  A similar 
approach makes spending later advantageous.  This shows us the minimum required 
expenditures to complete all actions within the six-year implementation period.   
3. Changes to Other Plans and Schedules 
There is no need to change operational or transformation plans in order to 
accomplish BRAC on time.  We include these schedules for major units, including the 1st 
Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division from Germany, 2nd Infantry Division from 
Korea, and the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), currently at Fort Bragg.  BRACAS 
produces a supporting movement schedule and budget.  The impact on total savings is 
negligible (less than $4 million) when compared to an otherwise identical model where 
units can move at any time.   
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It is important to note we limited only a few major units in their availability to 
move.  If all RC units are similarly restricted, the impact on savings could be more 
dramatic.   
We must emphasize here the unit availability data:  Rotation schedules, force 
levels requirements, and implementation timelines for both transformation and life-cycle 
manning are difficult if not impossible to forecast accurately a full six years. Some of the 
required data may also be classified (a classified version could be used).  This essential 
input data must be carefully examined and validated before drawing conclusions and 
approving implementation plans. 
4. Maximum Savings Given Unlimited Budgets 
 We find the Army could save an additional $900 million with an unlimited 
budget, compared to the proposed budget (see Figure 2 and Table 3).  The budget 
required for optimal savings, also shown in Table 3, is likely infeasible due to other 
considerations.  Figure 2 compares optimal execution by fiscal year (FY) for planned and 
unconstrained budgets. From this we infer an increase in the year one budget may incur 
additional net savings.  The potential $900 million reward warrants a detailed exploration 
of possible budget levels.   
























Fiscal Year Limit Planned Unlimited Difference
2006 1000 1000.00 2484.41 1484.41
2007 2000 2000.00 2163.49 163.46
2008 3000 2828.46 2244.1 -584.36
2009 none 1697.89 1084.5 -613.38
2010 none 3212.40 1597.25 -1615.15
2011 2000 2000.00 3178.59 1178.59
 
Table 3. Optimal Execution of Planned and Unlimited Budgets ($ Millions). 
 
5. Additional Costs or Savings from Dictating a Movement Schedule 
We schedule the move of 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions, and their 
associated support units, to 2006 and 2008, respectively.  If we assume no additional 
costs for these early moves, we find an additional savings of nearly $4 billion in total 
NPV.  However, if we represent the estimated cost of temporary facilities as 25% of the 
total MILCON bill at the gaining installations, these moves lose over $1 billion in NPV.  
We see two possible causes for this: the direct additional MILCON cost, and the 
reallocation of funds from other BRAC actions in early years, delaying other savings.  
Clearly our assumption that there would be no additional costs is unrealistic.  However, if 
these costs amount to less than $4 billion total, an early move will be beneficial. We 
conclude this early return of forces from overseas is potentially profitable, but very 
sensitive to additional costs.   
6. Effect of Moving Units before Construction is Complete 
Referring to the proposed move of units from Germany in 2006 and 2008 
described above, we see that an additional facility cost as low as 25% of the planned total 
can have a negative impact on overall savings.  In general, early moves mean significant 
additional costs, and should not be the general rule.  However, with accurate cost 
estimates, BRACAS can assist in determining which early moves are most valuable. 
7. Requirements for Fastest Possible Completion of All Actions 
Tables 4 and 5 show the total and MILCON budgets required to complete all 
actions at the earliest possible date.  Figure 3 depicts the number of units moving by each 
FY.  There appears to be little benefit from undue haste in implementation. 
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8. Delayed Implementation 
Tables 4 and 5 show the total and MILCON budgets that delay BRAC 
implementation as much as possible.  Figure 3 depicts the unit moves by FY.  Note that 
nearly every unit moves in the last year, an undesirable outcome due to possible readiness 
implications.  Only minimum required MILCON budgets are paid prior to the last year, 
when about half of the total implementation dollars are spent.  The sole advantage of this 
approach seems to be the ability to maintain a low implementation budget for several 
years.  The penalty is a steep bill in the final year of implementation. 
 
Fiscal Year Planned Fastest Slowest 
2006 1000.00 5210.18 887.62
2007 2000.00 3240.60 1204.36
2008 2828.46 2334.26 1306.61
2009 1697.89 778.54 1270.25
2010 3212.40 735.88 2295.89
2011 2000.00 428.05 5761.32
Table 4. Total Budget Comparison by Implementation Plan ($ Millions). 
 
Fiscal Year Planned Fastest Slowest 
2006 412.36 1945.47 373.59
2007 1026.21 2604.71 712.63
2008 1465.91 1187.18 831.61
2009 1512.76 707.41 1232.62
2010 1683.41 700.96 2248.95
2011 1045.06 0 1746.32
Table 5. MILCON Budget Comparison by Implementation Plan ($ Millions). 
 


















Figure 3.   Unit Moves by Fiscal Year under Different Scenarios. 
32 
9. Regional MILCON Limits   
We first sought to limit the regional annual in-progress MILCON to $300 million.  
This was infeasible, primarily due to the large MILCON costs associated with Fort Bliss, 
Texas.  This necessitated the introduction of an elastic variable.  When we penalize this 
elastic variable, we get the optimal limits, by region by year.  The highest annual limit 
approached $600 million.  Figure 4 shows the amount the cap is exceeded by region by 
FY.  Based on these results, we tested a $500 million limit, and found this was feasible 










2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Fiscal Year









V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS FOR BRAC IMPLEMENTATION  
1. Synchronization of BRAC, Transformation, and War 
The Army is transforming and at war.  Our results show that BRAC 
implementation can be executed in this environment without major changes in budgets or 
unit schedules for deployment or transformation, while still yielding the anticipated 
savings. 
2. Additional Savings Possible 
The annual budget limits used for this analysis – $1 billion, $2 billion, and $3 
billion in FY 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively – may cost the Army up to $900 million 
in unrealized savings.  Further exploration of a variety of acceptable budget scenarios 
will likely reveal opportunities to achieve some portion of this potential savings.   
3. Impact of Early Movement of Overseas Forces 
Moving the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions from Germany to the United 
States in 2006 and 2008 as discussed is feasible, but this time is too short to complete all 
MILCON at the gaining installations.  Additional savings result if the cost of temporary 
facilities, renovations, or accelerated MILCON is under $4 billion.  However, if these 
additional costs reach 25% of the planned MILCON cost and yearly budgets are limited, 
these early moves lose $1 billion in NPV savings relative to waiting for MILCON 
completion.  Accurate cost estimates are essential to understand the true value of these 
actions.  Minimizing additional costs to enable these moves is essential to reap any 
additional savings. 
4. Flexibility in BRAC Implementation Schedule 
After considering the fastest and slowest possible implementation schedules we 
conclude there is significant flexibility in the timing of BRAC actions.  However, 
significant flexibility requires major shifts in budget levels, which may not be feasible.  
We speculate the large number of RC actions – relatively inexpensive actions with no 
unit timing restrictions – allow for many nearly optimal solutions even with a restricted 
budget without major schedule changes in deployments or transformation. 
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5. Regional MILCON Limits 
A proposed annual regional in-progress MILCON limit of $300 million is 
infeasible.  Both the Northeast and Southwest regions of IMA exceed this limit in most 
implementation years.  A cap of $500 million is feasible for all regions in all years.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Joint Implementation 
All services and DoD could use BRACAS, though other services may wish to 
consider additional constraints.  COBRA data is available, as are the data regarding unit 
strength and availability, though preparing and consolidating all data is a significant task.  
Other services may benefit from using BRACAS in detailed implementation planning to 
synchronize BRAC with their wartime requirements. 
2. Integrate All Basing Decisions 
The model can also incorporate the decisions regarding the basing of forces 
currently overseas.  While overseas basing decisions are distinct from BRAC, the model 
makes no such distinction.  BRACAS can readily accommodate a simultaneous 
exploration of the impact on budgets, transformation, or movement schedules of basing 
decisions, regardless of source. 
3. Refine Time Periods 
Currently the model allows a unit to do only one task in any six month period.  
This may be deployment, transformation, or moving to another installation.  By refining 
the time periods under consideration from half-years to quarters, it may be possible to 
find alternate implementation schedules.  These schedules may also generate slightly 
higher savings.  Implementing this change would require recoding of the cost data 
preprocessing within the model, and refinement of unit availability data.  Significant 
changes in annual budgets and total savings are unlikely, but a wider variety of possible 
unit movement schedules may be worth pursuing if there is dissatisfaction with the 
resulting schedules produced using half-years. 
4. Refine Projections for Unit Availability 
Projecting unit availability with accuracy several years into the future is a 
daunting challenge.  Nevertheless, this data is fundamental to the reliability of the results.  
There are techniques available to consider the persistence of a solution under changing 
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conditions [Brown, Dell, and Wood 1997].  We recommend that most accurate data on 
expected unit availability be used as a baseline.  If provided alternate data for likely 
scenarios (increased or decreased wartime requirements, increased modularity 
requirements, etc.), solutions can be compared to determine whether they are effective in 
all scenarios.  Comparing model results under a variety of possibilities can produce an 
implementation plan that will be good under this uncertainty. 
5. Retain a Strategic Reserve During Implementation 
With forces heavily committed to combat operations, and some units unavailable 
due to transformation, LCM, or unit moves, the Army must be cautious about 
maintaining adequate forces to deal with any contingency that may arise.  An analysis of 
combat unit availability, incorporating deployments, transformation and the BRAC 
movement plan may show too few units in reserve at times.  BRACAS can be modified 
to limit total moves by time period, producing an alternate movement schedule that 
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